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Dollarization: Concepts and Implications




Currency substitution implies the greater share of foreign currency in the
asset holdings of domestic residents. Dollarization is the complete
replacement of the local currency——    in this case, the peso——   by a foreign
currency, most likely the US dollar. The paper finds that dollarization or
official dollarization has both its costs and benefits but it is not a viable
option for the Philippines at the moment.
INTRODUCTION
Many economies have a significant amount of foreign currency
in their monetary systems.  It would therefore be useful to analyze
the role of foreign currency in terms of its contribution to the
economy and its effect on macroeconomic stability.  The nature of
its role would provide the basis for policy recommendations.
The presence of foreign currency implies a certain level of
dollarization.  The main objective of this paper is to determine
whether dollarization is relevant in the Philippine economy and, if
indeed it is, how it may affect monetary policy.  Basic concepts related
to this topic will be explained and clarified in the next section.  A
brief description of the dollarization process in the Philippines is
presented in the third section while analytical and empirical issues
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related to dollarization are discussed in the fourth section. It should
be emphasized at the outset that the econometric tests are
constrained by data availability and the results are generally flawed.
However, the results are reported to provide both a flavor of the
type of tests involved and a sense of the difficulty involved in
carrying out these tests.  Policy considerations are the topic of the
fifth section while the sixth section provides the conclusions.
BASIC CONCEPTS2
Dollarization denotes the use of a foreign currency in any of its
three functions: unit of account, means of exchange and, in particular,
store of value.  It refers to the use of any foreign currency although
the US dollar is the most common (hence the term). Meanwhile, the
term currency substitution refers to the use of foreign currency as a
means of exchange.  Hence, an economy that is experiencing
currency substitution is by definition also dollarized (partially) but
an economy that is dollarized (partially) does not necessarily
experience currency substitution.
Partial dollarization occurs when people hold a portion of their
financial wealth in foreign assets.  This is equivalent to “asset
substitution,” which results from the public’s allocation decisions
in view of the risk and return characteristics of domestic and foreign
assets.  In a later stage (sometimes called unofficial dollarization,
depending on the extent of use of foreign currency), currency
substitution occurs, even if foreign currency is not considered legal
tender.  Wages, taxes and everyday expenses such as groceries and
electric bills continue to be paid in domestic currency, but expensive
items such as automobiles and houses are often paid in foreign
currency.
Semiofficial dollarization occurs when an economy has an official
bi-monetary system.  Under this system, foreign currency is legal
tender and may even dominate bank deposits, but plays a secondary
2 Drawn heavily from US Senate Joint Economic Committee (2000).YAP : Dollarization 89
role to domestic currency in paying wages, taxes and everyday
expenses.  Semiofficial dollarized economies maintain a central bank
or other monetary authority and have corresponding latitude to
conduct their own monetary policy.
Official dollarization, also called full dollarization, occurs when
foreign currency has exclusive or predominant status as full legal
tender. That means not only is foreign currency legal for use in
contracts between private parties, but the government uses it in
payments.  Domestic currency may still exist— —as it does in
Panama— —but it is confined to a very minor role, usually coins that
are used for small change.
Most economies, including the Philippines, are partially
dollarized.  Examples of semiofficially dollarized countries are
Cambodia and Laos, with the Thai baht also considered legal tender
in the latter.  Panama is the largest country that is officially dollarized
and uses the US dollar.  Monaco is an example of an independent
country that uses the French franc— —and eventually the Euro— — as
an official currency.
Currency substitution arises when high and variable inflation
rates discourage the use of the domestic currency.  Asset substitution
can also result from the flight from the domestic currency as people
turn to foreign currency-denominated assets as a store of value.
However, in recent years, dollarization has become more prevalent
because of institutional changes, particularly capital account
liberalization.  Hence, the increase in foreign currency assets in recent
years is a consequence of portfolio decisions under stable
macroeconomic conditions.
DOLLARIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Theoretically, the extent of dollarization is measured by the
amount of dollar-denominated assets held by nationals.  These cover
dollar currency circulating within the economy, foreign currency
deposits in the domestic economy and cross-border deposits held
in banks abroad. Since dollarization is usually related to monetary
developments, other dollar-denominated assets (e.g., foreign bonds)PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 90
are excluded from the analysis.  In practice, because of data
constraints, the extent of dollarization is usually measured by the
ratio of foreign currency deposits (FCDs) held by residents to a broad
money aggregate.  Using the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
standard, an economy is considered highly dollarized if the ratio is
greater than 30 percent.  Otherwise it is moderately dollarized.
Theoretically, all assets must be considered including foreign
currency circulating as cash in the domestic economy and cross-
border deposits.  However, data considerations limit the analysis to
FCDs.
Table 1 shows that the ratio of FCDs to M3 for the Philippines
increased from 11.8 percent in 1986 to 40.7 percent as of June 2000
(FCD/M3).  However, if this ratio is corrected for exchange rate
changes (FCD$/M3), then the increase is less pronounced.
Meanwhile, the ratio of FCDs to M4, which is comparable to the
IMF figures in Table 1, increased from 10.5 to 28.9 percent in the
same period.  This implies that the Philippines is nearing the
threshold for a highly dollarized economy based on the standard
set by IMF.
Table 1. Ratio of FCDs to broad money aggregates 
YEAR  FCD  FCD/M3  FCD$/M3  FCD/M4  Ratio reported 
  (Bill P)        by IMF 
1986  17.01  11.8  0.58  10.5  - 
1987  20.54  12.7  0.61  11.3  - 
1988  28.49  15.1  0.71  13.1  - 
1989  42.70  16.8  0.76  14.4  - 
1990  64.74  21.5  0.77  17.7  17.4 
1991  79.02  22.8  0.85  18.5  18.0 
1992  104.25  27.1  1.07  21.3  21.0 
1993  147.25  30.7  1.10  23.5  22.6 
1994  167.08  27.5  1.14  21.5  20.9 
1995  216.30  28.4  1.08  22.1  21.5 
1996  331.75  37.6  1.43  27.3  - 
1997  426.91  40.0  1.07  28.6  - 
1998  471.16  41.1  1.03  29.2  - 
1999  506.12  37.1  0.91  27.0  - 
2000*  533.27  40.7  0.96  28.9  - 
*June 
Note: Data are end year. 
Sources: IMF (1999); Bangko Sentral and Pilipinas YAP : Dollarization 91
The increasing trend in dollarization is of course due to the
greater access of nationals to dollars.  The major channels are the
rise in remittances from overseas workers and export receipts.  From
only $546 million in 1981, remittances from overseas workers
increased to $6.8 billion in 1999 while exports rose from $5.7 billion
to $35.2 billion in the same period (Table 2).  Institutional factors
also played a key role.  The liberalization of regulations governing
foreign exchange transactions in 1992 facilitated the return of foreign-
based funds that had earlier left as capital flight. The new rules also
allowed exporters to retain 100 percent of their receipts.  Capital
account liberalization also sparked the surge of portfolio investment
to the Philippines (Table 2), which is consistent with the observation
that this regime change was the most important factor in the surge
of foreign equity flows to emerging market economies (Taylor and
Sarno 1997).  These developments were reflected in the FCD ratio to
broad money, which reached a pre-1996 peak in 1993.
Year  Overseas Filipino  Net    Net   
  workers' remittances  foreign direct  KB foreign  portfolio  Exports 
    investments  liabilities  investment  (nominal) 
1981  545.87  175  4410  3  5722 
1985  687.20  17  2953  5  4629 
1990  1181.07  528  2324  152  8186 
1991  1500.29  529  2140  212  8840 
1992  2221.80  675  1911  451  9824 
1993  2276.40  864  1115  955  11375 
1994  3008.10  1289  2172  1641  13483 
1995  3868.40  1361  2975  1997  17447 
1996  4306.50  1338  7217  2179  20543 
1997  5741.80  1113  8165  -351  25228 
1998  4926.00  1592  7778  80  29496 
1999  6794.60  864  6899  347  35260.6 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
Table 2. Sources of foreign currency (in million US$)
Meanwhile, the uniform currency act was repealed in June 1996.
While the peso is recognized as the only legal tender, parties may
agree that the obligation or transaction will be settled in any other
currency at the time of payment.  Hence, foreign currency is de facto
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the legal tender in the Philippines.  An interesting point is that there
is no legal impediment for the Philippines to become a semiofficial
dollarized economy.
A sharp increase in the FCD-broad money ratio was recorded in
1996 and this has been sustained until June 2000.  While exchange
rate movements can explain the behavior of the ratio for the period
1997-2000 (as seen from the FCD$/M3 ratio), the reasons for the
jump in 1996 are not straightforward.  One possible factor is the
surge in foreign exchange liabilities of the commercial banks in 1996
(Table 2).  Commercial banks took advantage of the arbitrage
opportunity provided by the difference between international
interest rates and domestic interest rates.  This led to a sharp increase
in what is called liability dollarization.  However, by borrowing in
foreign currency and lending to domestic borrowers, who were
unhedged against exchange risk, commercial banks created one side
of the double-mismatch problem.  The other side was mismatch in
maturity which was exacerbated by the fact that most of the foreign
borrowing was short-term in nature.
ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES IN
DOLLARIZATION
Analytical aspects
One of the motivations for the study of currency substitution
was the Argentine experience in 1975 when a sizeable increase in
the rate of expansion of money supply was accompanied by a strong
depreciation of the real exchange rate (Calvo and Vegh 1996).  Since
this observation was counterintuitive, existing models had to be
modified. The existence of petrodollars in Argentina and the fact its
citizens held substantial amounts of foreign currency for transactions
purposes made currency substitution the most plausible element
that could resolve the shortcomings of existing models.YAP : Dollarization 93
The early model of currency substitution showed the demand
for domestic money relative to foreign currency to be given by:
m/e·f = L(i/i*) where L’ < 0 (1)
where  m denotes real money balances (in terms of domestic goods),
f is the stock of foreign currency, e is the real exchange rate (defined
as the relative price of traded goods in terms of home goods), and i
and i* denote the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates,
respectively.  A key assumption of the early models is that foreign
currency is the only internationally traded asset.  Hence, the only
way for the economy to alter its stock of foreign currency is through
current account imbalances.
Consider a permanent increase in the rate of growth of the money
supply.  The resulting increase in steady-state inflation reduces the
steady-state demand for domestic money relative to foreign money
(the domestic interest rate i should increase along with inflation).
The public reacts today by attempting to reduce its domestic nominal
money balances by buying foreign currency, which leads to a
nominal depreciation of the domestic currency.  The early models
assumed that prices were flexible hence the nominal depreciation
does not necessarily translate into a real depreciation of the domestic
currency.  To close the model, it is assumed that the steady-state
real exchange rate and total financial assets (m + e·f) are constant.
This implies that, in the steady state, f must increase for equation
(1) to hold.  Hence, the real exchange rate must depreciate on impact
to generate the current account surpluses necessary for the economy
to accumulate foreign assets.
Subsequent models dealt with the case when there is a foreign
bond.  This feature incorporates the aspect of an illiquid foreign
asset.  Earlier models obtained the key result— —that an increase in
money supply leads to a real exchange rate depreciation— —on the
assumption that the entire stock of net foreign assets in the hands of
the public provided liquidity services.  However, the same result
was obtained with the presence of the foreign bond but in aPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 94
completely different manner.  This is through the wealth effect that
arises from a reduction in seigniorage payments to the foreign
government that in turn results from lower holdings of foreign
currency.
The details of the adjustment process can be obtained elsewhere
(Calvo and Vegh 1996).  What is important is that the presence of an
illiquid foreign asset makes the distinction between currency and
asset substitution critical.  Second, it has been shown analytically
that the optimal choice of dollar assets depends only on the real
return differential [i* - (i - e)], where e is the rate of depreciation of
the domestic currency.  It does not depend on nominal returns or
on the liquidity services provided by currencies.
Empirical tests
The empirical literature on dollarization revolves around
variants of what have become the two standard tests of currency
substitution (Savastrano 1996).  The first test consists of estimating
an equation where the public’s relative holdings of domestic and
foreign currency is expressed as a function of their relative
opportunity costs and other relevant determinants.  A common
general form of the equation is:
M/e•F = f[(i – i*);  Ù), f(i – i*) < 0 (2)
where M represents nominal domestic money supply, e·F is foreign
currency converted to local currency, i and i* are the domestic and
foreign nominal interest rates, respectively, and ￿ is a vector of
various other determinants.   A coefficient of the variable (i - i*) that
is significantly different from zero is evidence of the relevance of
dollarization.
The second test consists of including the expected rate of
depreciation as an additional regressor in an otherwise standard
domestic money-demand equation.  The equation is of the following
general form:
M/P = f(Y, i, i*, ä), fi < 0, f ä < 0 (3)
M/e•F = f[(i – i*);  Ù),    f(i – i*) < 0    (2) 
M/P = f(Y, i, i*, ä),     fi < 0, fä < 0    (3) 
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where P is the domestic price level, Y is the level of real income, and
e is the expected rate of depreciation.  Again, a non-zero coefficient
of the variable e is indication of the relevance of dollarization.
Table 3 shows the estimation results for Equation 2 using
quarterly data from 1986 to the second quarter of 2000.  Gross
national product (GNP) was included as a possible determinant of
dollarization. The negative coefficient of GNP indicates that FCD
holdings increase with income.  The 91-day Treasury bill rate and
90-day LIBOR represent the domestic interest rate and foreign
interest rate, respectively.  Their difference carries the expected
negative coefficient and since it is significant, it is an indication that
dollarization is relevant in the Philippines.  Seasonal dummy
variables are included and the results indicate that FCD holdings
increase relatively in the last quarter of the year.  A lagged dependent
variable was added to account for serial correlation.  However, the
latter problem has not been completely eliminated as indicated by
the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Table 3  
Dependent Variable: M3/FCD 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/30/01   Time: 08:25 
Sample(adjusted): 1986:2 2000:2 
Included observations: 57 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  1.859125  0.811490  2.291003  0.0262 
GNP  -0.005572  0.002739  -2.034296  0.0472 
(TBILL – LIBOR)  -0.020670  0.008687  -2.379562  0.0212 
M3/FCD(-1)  0.897631  0.044768  20.05084  0.0000 
DUM1  -0.230634  0.104344  -2.210322  0.0317 
DUM2  -0.316661  0.099770  -3.173904  0.0026 
DUM3  -0.378324  0.109937  -3.441278  0.0012 
R-squared  0.987410      Mean dependent var  4.308255 
Adjusted R-squared  0.985900      S.D. dependent var  1.859130 
S.E. of regression  0.220762      Akaike info criterion  -0.068880 
Sum squared resid  2.436788      Schwarz criterion  0.182021 
Log likelihood  8.963069      F-statistic  653.5917 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.335032      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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The empirical results for Equation 3 are shown in Table 4.
Expected depreciation is assumed to be equal to actual depreciation.
However, if this variable is used as an explanatory variable, its
coefficient is positive, which is not the expected sign.  This implies
that a rise in the depreciation rate increases the holdings of domestic
money, which is a counterintuitive result.  An alternative is to use
the return to foreign assets measured in terms of domestic currency.
This would be the nominal foreign interest rate plus the rate of
depreciation.  The results in Table 5 show that the higher return on
foreign assets leads to lower holdings of foreign currency and hence
higher demand for domestic currency.
Dependent Variable: M3/CPI 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/22/01   Time: 09:13 
Sample(adjusted): 1986:1 2000:2 
Included observations: 58 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  -3.579633  0.841254  -4.255118  0.0001 
GDP  0.053401  0.003477  15.35762  0.0000 
TBILL  -0.105671  0.023176  -4.559409  0.0000 
DEPN  0.024396  0.007421  3.287480  0.0018 
R-squared  0.878471      Mean dependent var  5.173706 
Adjusted R-squared  0.871719      S.D. dependent var  1.895467 
S.E. of regression  0.678886      Akaike info criterion  2.129745 
Sum squared resid  24.88785      Schwarz criterion  2.271844 
Log likelihood  -57.76259      F-statistic  130.1127 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.004080      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Table 4
Both tests have their shortcomings.  Lack of data on holdings of
foreign currency notes by residents makes it impossible to test
directly for the presence of currency substitution as distinct from
asset substitution.  Hence, in Equation 2, the awkward result
showing that an increase in LIBOR leads to lower FCD holdings is
obtained.  The difficulty arises because interest rates on FCDs are
generally based on LIBOR. This can be remedied by using the return
as discussed in the third section, which is [i* - (i - e)] and test directly
for asset substitution.  However, the results in Table 6 show that
this variable is not significant.YAP : Dollarization 97
Dependent Variable: M3/CPI 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/19/01   Time: 08:07 
Sample(adjusted): 1986:1 2000:2 
Included observations: 58 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  -3.728939  0.823448  -4.528444  0.0000 
GDP  0.053662  0.003441  15.59394  0.0000 
TBILL  -0.109207  0.023510  -4.645210  0.0000 
LIBOR + DEPN  0.024539  0.007348  3.339411  0.0015 
R-squared  0.879113      Mean dependent var  5.173706 
Adjusted R-squared  0.872397      S.D. dependent var  1.895467 
S.E. of regression  0.677091      Akaike info criterion  2.124449 
Sum squared resid  24.75639      Schwarz criterion  2.266548 
Log likelihood  -57.60901      F-statistic  130.8992 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.042732      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Dependent Variable: M3/FCD 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/30/01   Time: 08:31 
Sample(adjusted): 1986:2 2000:2 
Included observations: 57 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  0.676964  0.719830  0.940449  0.3515 
GNP  -0.001978  0.002565  -0.770964  0.4444 
TBILL-(LIBOR+DEP)  0.000567  0.002573  0.220482  0.8264 
M3/FCD(-1)  0.951484  0.042035  22.63545  0.0000 
DUM1  -0.146263  0.105439  -1.387175  0.1715 
DUM2  -0.230198  0.100088  -2.299961  0.0257 
DUM3  -0.273127  0.108986  -2.506083  0.0155 
R-squared  0.985998      Mean dependent var  4.308255 
Adjusted R-squared  0.984318      S.D. dependent var  1.859130 
S.E. of regression  0.232814      Akaike info criterion  0.037429 
Sum squared resid  2.710110      Schwarz criterion  0.288330 
Log likelihood  5.933274      F-statistic  586.8347 









As for the second test, it has been argued that domestic money
demand will depend on the rate of exchange rate depreciation even
in the absence of currency substitution, because the rate of
depreciation affects the yield of foreign assets, which is an
opportunity cost to domestic money (IMF 1999).  This dovetails with
the reasons for using the variable (LIBOR + DEPN) in Table 5. ToPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 98
actually distinguish between currency and asset substitution, the
equation should include both the rate of return on foreign bonds in
domestic currency (LIBOR + DEPN) and the rate of depreciation
itself in the money demand equation.  Unfortunately, as the results
in Table 7 show, these variables are closely correlated and their
independent effects are essentially impossible to distinguish.
The usefulness of these tests is greatly constrained by the
availability of relevant data. For example, Equation 2 actually
requires the use of the narrow money concept both for domestic
and foreign currency.  Since the latter is not available, broader
concepts of money were used.  Not surprisingly, the empirical results
are not robust.3
Dependent Variable: M3/CPI 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 01/22/01   Time: 09:42 
Sample(adjusted): 1986:1 2000:2 
Included observations: 58 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
C  -3.790045  0.928962  -4.079869  0.0002 
GDP  0.053782  0.003568  15.07498  0.0000 
TBILL  -0.110254  0.024768  -4.451506  0.0000 
ERDEPN  -0.008991  0.061090  -0.147172  0.8836 
LIBORER  0.033398  0.060653  0.550649  0.5842 
R-squared  0.879162      Mean dependent var  5.173706 
Adjusted R-squared  0.870042      S.D. dependent var  1.895467 
S.E. of regression  0.683309      Akaike info criterion  2.158523 
Sum squared resid  24.74627      Schwarz criterion  2.336147 
Log likelihood  -57.59716      F-statistic  96.40115 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.055390      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
Table 7
3 One way to address the empirical shortcomings is to determine empirically which monetary
aggregate (M3 or M4) is able to track the price level or inflation more accurately.  This can be
done using a VAR  framework.  Some estimates done during the course of the study show
that M4 predicts the price level more accurately but the difference is only marginal.  The
results can be provided by the author upon request.YAP : Dollarization 99
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Even if the empirical tests could be improved, the more
important issue is still to ascertain the impact of dollarization on
the efficacy of monetary policy and its implication on the choice of
exchange rate regime.  In this regard, the rising trend of the FCD/
M4 ratio in Table 1 is enough evidence of the importance of
dollarization in the Philippines.  The presence of dollarization leads
to three distinct policy issues.  First, what are the costs and benefits
of full dollarization?  Second, how does partial dollarization affect
the choice of exchange rate regime? And third, how should monetary
policy be conducted in the presence of foreign currency?  The last
two issues are pertinent for economies that are not considering
official dollarization but have a significant amount of foreign
currency in their monetary systems.
Costs and benefits of dollarization
The primary cost of dollarization is the loss of seigniorage on
the part of the monetary authority.  Seigniorage is the revenue from
issuing currency and it is sometimes— —albeit mistakenly — —referred
to as the inflation tax.  Benefits from seigniorage can be measured
in both stock and flow terms.  The latter stems from the foregone
interest on international reserves that are used to purchase the stock
of domestic currency held by the public.  On the other hand, stock
costs refer to the foregone future earnings that result from the flow
of new currency that are printed every year to satisfy the increase in
the demand for money.  The seigniorage arises from the difference
between the cost of producing and distributing paper money and
coins and their purchasing power.
Some estimates show that seigniorage costs can be significant.
For an average country, the stock cost could be as much as 4-5 percent
of the gross domestic product (GDP) (US Senate Joint Economic
Committee 2000).  Meanwhile, the flow cost has been estimated at
0.2 percent of GDP for Argentina.  The present value would be about
20 percent of GDP.  One way to reduce seigniorage costs would be
for the dollarizing economy to enter into a treaty with the US toPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 100
share its revenues from seigniorage specific to that economy.  A bill
has been proposed in the US Congress entitled the “International
Monetary Stability Act.” This allows the US Secretary of the Treasury
to certify officially dollarized countries as eligible to receive rebates
of seigniorage from the US (US Joint Economic Committee 2000).
Another critical consideration would be the cost of losing
flexibility in monetary and exchange rate policy.  A fully dollarized
economy has no choice but to adopt the monetary policy of the
issuing country.  This has led to what is called asymmetric shocks
(Calvo 1999).  One could consider a shock that requires lower interest
rates or a depreciation of the real exchange rate in the dollarized
economy but has no effect on the US.  Under these conditions, US
monetary policy will not change and thus the dollarized economy
may have to undergo a recession in response to the shock.
The third potential cost would be losing the domestic central
bank as lender of last resort.  It should be noted that the
aforementioned International Monetary Stability Act explicitly states
that the US would not be obligated to act as a lender of last resort.
One solution is to arrange for lines of credit from foreign banks.
Branches of foreign banks can also provide credit directly to domestic
banks without government involvement (US Senate Joint Economic
Committee 2000).  Another alternative is for the central bank to
accumulate foreign exchange reserves and along with the treasury,
establish a stabilization fund, which can be used to counter bank
runs.
There is also the one-time cost of converting prices, computer
programs, cash registers and vending machines from domestic
currency to foreign currency.  This is akin to menu costs.  Finally,
countries may be reluctant to abandon their own currencies because
the domestic currency also acts as a national symbol.
Many of the costs cited above could be outweighed by benefits
that are derived from the same factors.  By adopting the monetary
policy of the US, dollarized economies will experience lower interest
rates and lower inflation.  This will increase investment spending
and spur economic growth.  In addition, the absence of an exchangeYAP : Dollarization 101
rate that has to be defended eliminates BOP crises and the rationale
for exchange controls.  Another way of looking at it is that the
monetary authority will not have to be concerned about credibility
problems with its exchange rate policy.
Meanwhile, by eliminating the government’s power to create
inflation, dollarization fosters the government’s budgetary
discipline.  While this will not eliminate budget deficits, the latter
will be financed through fairly transparent methods of higher taxes
or more government debt.  The rather risky option of printing money
cannot be considered.
Finally, dollarization will lower transaction costs in international
trade.  These stem partly from the difference between the buying
and selling rates for converting domestic currency to foreign
currency.  Hedging for currency risk will also become unnecessary.
Dollarization and exchange rate policy
If currency substitution is prevalent, the conventional wisdom
is that fixed exchange rates provide a more effective nominal anchor
(Calvo and Vegh 1996).  This is because frequent and unexpected
shifts in the use of domestic and foreign money leads to greater
volatility of the exchange rate (IMF 1999).  Moreover, domestic
money demand will be more sensitive to changes in the expected
opportunity cost.  Thus, a variable exchange rate would make it
more difficult for the monetary authority to control the money
supply.
In the case of asset substitution, the availability of dollar deposits
in domestic banks serves to increase capital mobility.  This will then
strengthen the link among interest rates in dollar deposits at home,
international dollar interest rates, and domestic currency interest
rates.  In turn, this would limit the control that the central bank can
exert on monetary conditions, such as the level of interest rates on
domestic currency.  In this regard, a flexible exchange arrangement
may be the more appropriate regime to increase monetary autonomy
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Meanwhile, the debate on full dollarization can also be
interpreted to be a debate on the appropriate exchange rate regime.
Following the Asian financial crisis, a more flexible exchange regime
has been followed by most of the affected economies, except
Malaysia.  The main reason for this is the experience that an implicit
dollar peg was one of the main factors behind the increase in liability
dollarization. A more flexible exchange rate would have discouraged
foreign-exchange-denominated borrowing, especially from the
nontradeable sector, since the borrowers would face a larger currency
risk.
However, this argument ignores the prevalent situation where
economies are already partially dollarized—— i.e., have existing dollar
liabilities (Calvo and Reinhart 1999).  Partial dollarization increases
the cost of exchange rate volatility, which, in turn, induces the central
bank to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to prevent
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate.  This results in an implicit
or soft peg, and thus induces more liability dollarization, creating a
vicious circle from which it is difficult to exit.
In order to avoid currency mismatch problems in a fixed
exchange rate regime, the option would be full dollarization.  This
would make the country less vulnerable to sudden stops in capital
flows (Calvo and Reinhart 1999).  Banks would not experience abrupt
changes in the value of their assets and/or liabilities and the currency
would not be subject to speculative attacks.
Dollarization and the conduct of monetary policy
Dollarization will affect the choice of monetary target, the
implementation of monetary policy and the structure of prudential
supervision.  Currency substitution implies that dollar monetary
assets should be part of the relevant concept of money when
targeting the price level.  On the other hand, asset substitution does
not affect the transaction demand for money and hence implies that
FCDs should not be included in the relevant monetary aggregate.
In practice, the choice of the more relevant monetary target is an
empirical issue (see Footnote 3).YAP : Dollarization 103
Heavily dollarized economies should consider the use of dollar-
denominated instruments in affecting monetary conditions.
However, the effectiveness of the instrument will be affected by the
degree of substitutability between dollar-denominated government
bonds and dollar assets available outside the home country.  The
higher is the degree of substitutability, the lower is the effectiveness
of the instrument (IMF 1999).
Meanwhile, in heavily dollarized economies, foreign currency
reserve requirements can play a useful role as automatic liquidity
stabilizers (IMF 1999).  Reserve requirements on FCDs can also be
used to automatically sterilize or discourage capital inflows.  Because
the Philippines is not yet heavily dollarized, reserve requirements
have not yet been imposed on FCDs.  However, banks are required
to provide 100 percent cover.
The 1997 financial crisis exposed the risks of liability
dollarization.  While the management of such risks is the broad
responsibility of macroeconomic policy, prudential regulation and
supervision need to account for the vulnerability imparted to bank
balance sheets.  Hence there is need to monitor the compliance
with the Basle guidelines for capital adequacy. Moreover,
limits on foreign exchange positions— —following international
standards— —should be strictly enforced to contain foreign exchange
risk (IMF 1999).  Imposing restrictions on foreign currency loans is
another option.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since the Philippines is not a heavily dollarized economy, the
issue of full dollarization is not relevant as of this time.  Nevertheless,
the presence of foreign currency deposits does affect the efficacy of
monetary and exchange rate policy.  This may partially explain why
the inflationary effects of currency depreciation have been muted,
as compared to 1983, and also why the hike in interest rates in
October 2000 hardly made a dent on the rate of the peso’s
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The choice of the appropriate exchange regime becomes critical
in the presence of both asset substitution and liability dollarization.
The more flexible exchange regime since July 1997 has corrected
price distortions that led to misallocation of resources.  It is also
consistent with the argument that in the presence of asset
substitution, a flexible exchange rate regime is necessary to increase
monetary autonomy.  However, the more volatile exchange rate has
made it difficult for banks to manage their dollar loans.  This may
be one reason why the nonperforming loan ratio has not stabilized
in the Philippines.
A recommendation for the choice of exchange rate regime is
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, it can be stated that even
if the Philippines becomes heavily dollarized, full dollarization——
in the context of using the US dollar— —may not be an optimal
strategy.  Aside from the costs mentioned above, the Philippines
has a large volume of trade with Japan. The volatility of the yen-
dollar exchange rate should be reason enough for countries of East
Asia— — which are considered to be part of a yen bloc— —to be cautious
about moves toward dollarization.
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